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Abstract 
BUSINESS AUTHORITY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE:  
Beyond public and private 
 
by Janne Mende1 
This paper discusses the concept of authority in global governance by unpacking the com-
ponents that characterize its various notions. These components are the triadic relation-
ship between power, legitimacy, and the reference to public interests, and how they are 
embedded in the constellation between public and private. After clarifying each of these 
components, the article applies them to business enterprises – key actors in global gov-
ernance –, focusing on the issue area of business and human rights. The paper shows that 
business authority does not neatly fit into the public-private distinction that is pervasive 
in conceptions of global governance and the international human rights regime. Instead, 
businesses have public and private, as well as hybrid, roles in global governance. Business 
authority then forms a peculiar third, next to public authority and private authority. Ac-
cordingly, the paper suggests extending the two-pole constellation of public and private 
into a three-pole constellation, with business building a peculiar third position between 
and beyond the public and the private. This approach allows furthering the understanding 
of business authority in global governance in particular and the concept of authority in 
global governance more generally. 
 
Keywords: Authority, power, legitimacy, global governance, human rights, business enterpris-
es, public interests 
 
 
                                                   
1 The paper was presented at the Global Governance Colloquium at the WZB Berlin Social Science 
Center, the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, the School of 
Global Studies at the University of Gothenburg, and the Political Science Colloquium at the Technical 
University Darmstadt. The author thanks the participants for their excellent comments. The paper is 
based on research that is funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research 
Foundation), project number 398306144. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Unternehmensautorität in der Global Governance: 
Jenseits von Öffentlich und Privat 
 
von Janne Mende2 
Den pluralen Perspektiven auf Autorität in der Global Governance sind vier Elemente ge-
meinsam. Autorität lässt sich demnach bestimmen als ein triadisches Verhältnis zwischen 
Macht, Legitimität und dem Bezug auf öffentliche Interessen. Diese Triade ist eingebettet 
in eine vermittelte Konstellation von Öffentlichkeit und Privatheit. Nach einer konzeptu-
ellen Klärung dieser vier Elemente von Autorität diskutiert das Paper Unternehmen als 
zentrale Governance-Akteure im Themenbereich Wirtschaft und Menschenrechte. Deutlich 
wird, dass die Autorität von Unternehmen sich nicht in die Unterscheidung von öffentlich 
und privat einordnen lässt, die gleichwohl für die Governance-Forschung und für das in-
ternationale Menschenrechtsregime prägend ist. Vielmehr haben Unternehmen sowohl 
öffentliche als auch private und darüber hinaus auch hybride Governance-Rollen inne. 
Ausgehend von den Konzepten privater Autorität und öffentlicher Autorität schlägt das 
Paper daher vor, Unternehmens-Autorität als eine dritte Form zu verstehen, die gleichzei-
tig zwischen und jenseits von Öffentlichkeit und Privatheit situiert ist. Diese Perspektive 
trägt zu einem erweiterten Verständnis von Unternehmens-Autorität in der Global Gover-
nance bei und erlaubt sowohl konzeptuelle als auch normative Anknüpfungspunkte. 
Stichworte: Autorität, Macht, Legitimität, Global Governance, Menschenrechte, Unternehmen, 
öffentliche Interessen  
 
 
                                                   
2 Dieses Paper wurde in Kollquien der Abteilung Global Governance am WZB Berlin, dem Max-Planck-
Institut für Ausländisches Öffentliches recht und Völkerrecht, der School of Global Studies an der 
Universität Gothenburg und dem Politikwissenschaftlichen Kolloquium an der Technischen Univer-
sität Darmstadt präsentiert. Die Autorin dankt den Teilnehmenden für ihre exzellenten Kommentare. 
Dieses Paper basiert auf Forschung, die von der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) gefördert 
wird, Projektnummer 398306144. 
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1. Introduction 
Since global governance began to transform the world order in the late 20th century, 
International Relations (IR) research has sought to define the authority of global gov-
ernance actors. The two are even being equated: “‘Global governance’ refers to the ex-
ercise of authority across national borders as well as consented norms and rules be-
yond the nation state” (Zürn 2018: 3f., emphasis added).i At the same time, the multi-
plication of global governance actors challenges capturing the forms and scope of 
their authority. Accordingly, there is a widespread push to scrutinize the authority of 
companies as key actors in global governance (Cutler 2018; Bell 2013; Ou-
gaard/Leander 2010; Wettstein 2009; Fuchs/Lederer 2007).  
The exercise of authority in global governance refers to the ability to govern and 
rule oneself and others, and to take part in developing, interpreting and implementing 
norms and laws. Understanding authority in global governance is complicated by the 
peculiar constellation of public and private roles on the global level. It challenges IR 
studies to “push the study of global governance beyond the notion of ‘add actors and 
processes into the international organization mix and stir’” (Weiss/Wilkinson 2014: 
213, also cf. Enroth 2013). Global governance entails the inclusion of private and 
transnational actors in the domain of governing, which extends the classic notion in 
international law and international cooperation that depicts state actors as the only 
governing (and therefore public) actors. This challenges classic (i.e., pre-global govern-
ance, Westphalian) theories of public authority; these theories cannot simply be trans-
ferred from the state to the global level. Rather, the interactions between public and 
private dimensions have a profound influence on authority in global governance. Ac-
cordingly, scholars disagree about whether to conceptualize authority in global gov-
ernance as public or private (Zürn 2018). 
Against this background, this article discusses authority in global governance by 
unpacking the components that characterize its various notions. These components 
are the triadic relationship between power, legitimacy, and the reference to public 
interests, and how they are embedded in the public-private constellation. This ap-
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proach is not designed to gloss over the differences in notions of authority. Rather, it 
proposes that even in otherwise differing accounts of authority, these four compo-
nents are pivotal to understanding and explaining it.  
These components are most visible in institutionalized forms of participation in 
regulation. However, they can be less visible, as global governance also includes in-
formal and soft mechanisms of participation. The paper thus emanates from global 
governance definitions that include both formal and informal mechanisms of both 
state and non-state actors (Ruggie 2004: 519). 
Applying these components to business enterprises as one of the most important 
non-state actors in global governance, and analyzing their role in the issue area of 
human rights, the article suggests that the two-pole constellation of public and pri-
vate does not sufficiently capture the authority of companies in global governance. 
Rather, businesses have public and private, as well as hybrid roles. Business authority 
then forms a peculiar third, next to public authority and private authority. According-
ly, the article suggests extending the two-pole constellation of public and private into 
a three-pole constellation, with business building a peculiar third position between 
and beyond the public and the private.  
The article has therefore two aims. First, it contributes to the study of authority in 
global governance more generally. Second, it investigates the peculiar role of compa-
nies in global governance. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 conceptualizes 
authority in global governance as a triad of power, legitimacy and reference to public 
interests, and how they are embedded in the public-private constellation. Section 2 
applies this frame to businesses as one of the major actors in global governance. Sec-
tion 3 scrutinizes the triadic relations of business authority by focusing on the field of 
business and human rights. Section 4 proposes situating business authority between 
and beyond the public and the private, building a peculiar third. The final section dis-
cusses the empirical and normative conclusions that can be drawn from the concept of 
business authority in global governance. 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
i Also cf. Lake 2010: 590: “governance is the exercise of authority by an actor over some limited 
community” (emphasis added). 
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2. Authority in Global Governance 
This section demonstrates that differing definitions of authority overlap, in that they 
consist of three interconnected components: power, legitimacy, and the reference to 
public interests, which are embedded in a fourth one: the public-private constellation 
of global governance.ii Research on each concept is abundant, and this section does not 
aim at providing conclusive definitions of each. Rather, this section focuses on sketch-
ing out a triadic framework which shows that the three components are closely inter-
linked. Each affects the other, in either an enhancing or restricting way. At the same 
time, each component contains parts that go beyond authority. 
2.1 Power 
Power is the first major component of authority; it is central to all definitions of au-
thority, including disagreements about whether power equals authority. While power 
is a much discussed and pluralistically defined concept, Lukes’ famous three faces of 
power serve as a major reference point for different approaches in global governance 
research.  
The first face represents the power to push through one’s interests in decision-
making processes and to influence their output.iii This aspect is also called instrumen-
tal power (Fuchs 2004: 136), as it is often based on material resources, but also on en-
forcement instruments such as weapons (Barnett/Finnemore 2005: 176).  
The second face is the power to set agendas, frame knowledge, define problems 
and their solutions, and thereby influence the input side of policy. A has power in this 
sense if she can create or reinforce practices or norms that frame a political agenda, 
thereby hindering B from formulating her own interests and norms (Lukes 2005: 20 
based on Bachrach/Baratz 1970). This agenda-setting power includes institutional pow-
                                                   
ii For the following argument, other differences in concepts of authority can be disregarded. This 
includes the question of whether authority only exists in hierarchical relationships (Zürn 2018). Or 
cf. Bartelson 2010: 219 assuming and Barnett/Finnemore 2005: 170 doubting a strong relationship 
between legitimacy and compliance. The following argument also neglects the differentiation be-
tween normative and empirical or sociological sources for legitimacy, and considers them as inter-
woven instead (Thornhill 2011; Staden 2016). On the general importance of power and legitimacy for 
authority, cf. Friedman 1990: 56. For a concise overview of the differing approaches to authority, cf. 
Peters/Schaffer 2013.  
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ers (Barnett/Finnemore 2005: 177) and “power structures underlying behavioral op-
tions” (Lukes 2005: 20ff., also cf. Fuchs 2004: 137; Strange 2009). 
The third face of power captures the ability to form and shape (the perception of) 
ideas, interests and wishes, even before they (do not) become a part of a political 
agenda, by way of socialization, internalization, habitualization and incorporation 
(Lukes 2005: 139ff.). This discursive power lies at the heart of constructivist approaches 
in IR and global governance research (Carstensen/Schmidt 2015). It is exercised 
through norms, rules, standards, identities, and political, cultural, religious, social, and 
discursive practices and institutions. Discursive power includes the ability to frame 
the perception of ideas and interests, including their claim to contribute to public in-
terests (Barnett/Finnemore 2005: 180). It “does not simply pursue interests but creates 
them” (Fuchs 2004: 138). Compliance then becomes habitual (Hurd 1999: 388).iv 
Examining the three faces of power facilitates a clearer understanding of authori-
ty: “Authority involves more than the ability to get people to do what they otherwise 
would not; authority often consists of telling people what is the right thing to do. 
There is a persuasive and normative element in authority that is tightly linked to its 
legitimacy” (Barnett/Finnemore 2005: 170). Hence, the discursive face of power is in-
extricably linked to legitimacy, and thereby contributes to an actor’s authority.v How-
ever, authority cannot simply be equated with discursive power, because the refer-
ence to public interests may be interlinked with the other faces of power as well. Ma-
terial power can provide an indispensable prerequisite for the ability to contribute to 
public interests, and the sheer extent of material power can explain why an actor is 
compelled to contribute to public interests, and thereby to legitimate their power in 
the first place. 
                                                                                                                                                     
iii “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise 
do.” (Lukes 2005: 16, based on Dahl 1957) 
iv Other approaches add a fourth face of power, capturing Foucault’s understanding of power as pro-
ductive and producing (Digesser 1992). While Lukes rejects such an extension of power definitions in 
order to delineate power as domination from simply any form of socialization (Lukes 2005: 88ff.), 
other approaches tend to conflate the third and fourth face, as for both the mechanisms of socializa-
tion and internalization are pivotal. 
v Accordingly, both Fuchs and Lukes tie this face to the legitimacy of power (Fuchs 2004: 138; Lukes 
2005: 112f.). 
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2.2 Legitimacy 
The second major component of authority is legitimacy. With regard to legitimacy, 
definitions of authority in global governance can be bundled into two major strands. 
The first strand suggests that authority equals legitimate power, i.e. power endowed 
with legitimacy. “What differentiates authority from power is the legitimacy of claims 
of authority. That is, there are both rights claimed by some superior authority and 
obligations recognized as legitimate on the part of subordinates or subjects to that 
authority” (Hall/Biersteker 2002: 4, also Venzke 2013; Lake 2010; Ruggie 1982; 
Onuf/Klink 1989; Milner 1991; Hurd 1999, going back to Weber 1979: 33ff.). According 
to Hurd, “the phrase legitimate authority is, strictly speaking, redundant” (Hurd 1999: 
400). An actor’s power to rule and to set norms is legitimated by her recognition by 
the ruled: “An actor may be powerful regardless of what others think, but she is only 
authoritative if others recognize her as such. Other levers of power may be seized or 
taken, but authority must be conferred” (Barnett/Finnemore 2005: 170). 
Definitions of authority of the second strand, in contrast, emphasize a difference 
between authority and legitimacy: “authority is to be distinguished from legitimacy: 
authority implies a rebuttable claim to legitimacy” (Bogdandy et al. 2017: 140, refer-
ring to Raz 1988). This notion suggests that one major reason for the rise of populism 
and the retreat of multilateralism is the lack of legitimacy of the – still relevant – 
(Hooghe et al. 2017; Zürn 2018) authority of international institutions: “international 
institutions exercise authority but cannot build on sufficient stocks of legitimacy” 
(Zürn et al. 2012: 70). For Zürn et al., authority is based on recognition as a first layer, 
which may or may not lead to legitimacy as a second layer (ibid.: 83).  
Both strands thus envision strong, but differing relationships between power and 
legitimacy. A way to reconcile the two is to see legitimacy as one component of au-
thority, standing in a causal relation to its other components. Both strands capture the 
relocation of power from states to other actors in global governance as neither a 
forceful acquisition nor as a simple principal-agent model. Rather, authority in global 
governance is an exercise of power that ideally is – or strives to be – based on legiti-
macy. Zürn, a major contributor to the second strand, emphasizes the relevance of 
legitimacy for authority without equating the two: “Inter- and transnational authori-
 
8 
 
ties require legitimation” – at least in the long run (Zürn 2018: 9 and 62ff., similarly 
Buchanan/Keohane 2006: 407). On the basis of this requirement, the contestation of 
authorities is possible. “Without legitimacy, authority is likely undermined or must 
depend on coercion, secrecy, and trickery to obtain sway – and governance is often 
less effective as a result” (Tallberg et al. 2018: 3).  
Therefore, the main difference between the two strands relates to the point at 
which an authority ceases to be acknowledged as an authority – i.e., once it loses (or 
does not acquire) its legitimacy. Yet, both strands view legitimacy as a causal compo-
nent of authority. Authority may rise or fall as legitimacy increases or decreases, but 
this trajectory depends on other factors as well. Accordingly, both strands conceptual-
ize authority as legitimate “in the context of a given stock of normative beliefs in a 
community” (Zürn et al. 2012: 83). Similarly, Barnett and Finnemore emphasize that 
the “exercise of authority in reasonable and normatively acceptable ways bolsters its 
legitimacy” (Barnett/Finnemore 2005: 170).  
At this point, concepts of legitimacy from the again abundant literature align. Le-
gitimacy cannot be understood on its own; it always refers to the legitimacy of some-
thing or someone, hence its close relationship with power. “Legitimacy, as I use it 
here, refers to the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be 
obeyed. It is a subjective quality, relational between actor and institution, and defined 
by the actor’s perception of the institution” (Hurd 1999: 381, emphasis in original). The 
different concepts of legitimacy share the element of recognition by subordinates (al-
so cf. the definitions in Beetham 2013: 11ff.; Raz 1988; Zürn et al. 2012: 83; Bodansky 
2013), yet differ with regard to the weight and scope of recognition, or which ele-
ments need to accompany recognition in order to qualify as legitimate, such as en-
dorsement, confidence or trust (Tallberg et al. 2018).  
Legitimacy thus depends on shared beliefs (Zürn et al. 2012: 83), on the “minimal 
moral acceptability” of an actor or institution (Buchanan/Keohane 2006: 219), on the 
justifiability of established rules that legitimate power with the reference to shared 
beliefs (Beetham 2013: 11ff.), or on other forms of justification (Simmons 1999). This 
article suggests capturing these different approaches as the third component of au-
thority: the reference to public interests. 
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2.3 Reference to public interests 
The political and social norms of those who are subject to authority influence what 
they consider to be legitimate (Bartelson 2010: 219; Reus-Smit 2007; Smith 2013). 
They all share an element of public interests (Reus-Smit 2001; Ruggie 2004; Abraham-
sen/Williams 2014). “Reduced to its essence, then, the core demand of authority is to 
make the institutionalization of power in the best interests of the governed popula-
tion.” (Koppell 2007: 194) Hence, it is pivotal for an authority to refer to public inter-
ests in order to legitimate its power. 
According to the Westphalian notion of state authority, the state (as the public ac-
tor) is endowed with legitimacy and thus authority based on its contribution to public 
interests, which are (ideally) determined via democratic mechanisms (Best/Gheciu 
2014; Münkler/Fischer 1999; Schuppert/Neidhardt 2002). In global governance, demo-
cratic mechanisms are supplemented by other sources of legitimacy, such as moral 
standing or technical expertise (Hall/Biersteker 2002; Cutler et al. 1999). This is be-
cause the reference to public interests is pivotal to the very definition of global gov-
ernance (Zürn 2013: 408; Börzel 2008: 122; Ruggie 2004: 500). Global governance rests 
on the assumption that public interests can no longer be fulfilled only at the domestic 
level; cooperation and regulation beyond the state are thus necessary to pursue public 
interests globally (Habermas 1998; Scharpf 1998; Zürn 2018: 4).  
This article therefore defines the third component of authority as the reference to 
public interests. Public interests can hardly be predefined, as they are a matter of de-
liberation and controversy (Scharpf 2004; Zürn 2013). By definition, their forms and 
scope must remain open. Yet it is possible to identify three major points of reference.  
First, with various degrees of emphasis in different political systems and ideas 
(especially with regard to the paradigm of privatization), public goods such as infra-
structure, water, electricity, hospitals and education serve as important public inter-
ests (Münkler/Fischer 1999).  
The second point of reference relates to the principles documented in the United 
Nations Charter as the founding document of a new phase of global cooperation: in-
ternational peace and security. 
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A third point that has become a major dimension of public interests in recent dec-
ades is the human rights regime. Even though empirically, human rights are not ful-
filled everywhere, and conceptually, they are a matter of dispute, the international 
human rights regime builds a normative framework that is rarely explicitly contested 
(Mende 2019; Kumm 2013; Sikkink 2017). States’ legitimacy – and even sovereignty – 
has become connected to the frame of human rights (Donnelly 2013). 
In the twenty-first century, there is not a single state left in the international system 
that has not ratified at least one international human rights treaty […]. Moreover, there 
is universal agreement that fundamental human rights constitute ius cogens, i.e. that 
part of international law to which states commit irrespective of whether or not they 
are party to individual treaties. (Risse/Ropp 2013: 9) 
These three points of reference provide a frame for public interests, including shared 
norms and beliefs, which remain open to deliberation and contingence.  
The reference to public interests should be differentiated from both the empirical 
fulfillment of public interests and from the recognition that public interests are being 
fulfilled; the latter instead denotes legitimacy. In the triadic framework, the reference 
to public interests refers to the claim (also cf. (Reus-Smit 2007: 159; Clark 2007) by a 
given authority that it contributes to public interests, which is supposed to legitimize 
its power. This includes a “communicative act. The exercise of authority in particular 
comes with a claim to be rightful and to be obeyed” (Zürn 2018: 4, emphasis added). 
The reference to public interests is a necessary condition for legitimization for 
the purposes of exercising authority, not least because authority may restrict its sub-
jects. “In a nutshell, the exercise of international public authority is the adoption of an 
act that affects the freedom of others in pursuance of a common interest” (Bogdandy 
et al. 2017: 117, similar Venzke 2013). At the same time, the reference to public inter-
ests limits authority. This is necessary in democratically informed concerns about 
power, and in terms of the empirical legitimacy of power (Bogdandy et al. 2017: 123f.). 
The recognition of power via its reference to public interests can be withdrawn 
(Avant/Haufler 2014: 48). Thus, authority can be contested and disputed (Zürn 2018). 
2.4 The public-private constellation  
Concepts of authority in global governance do not only consider the power of states, 
but also focus on international institutions (international public authority, cf. Bog-
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dandy et al. 2017) and the power of non-state actors. While some authors consider the 
latter as private authority (Biersteker/Hall 2002; Cutler et al. 1999), others insist they 
hold public authority (Zürn 2018). Furthermore, concepts of liquid authority empha-
size the less formalized, and more dynamic and pluralistic, forms of global authority 
(Krisch 2017). The public-private constellation is therefore pivotal to understanding 
authority in global governance. Strikingly, concepts of authority in global governance 
do not simply substitute public with private (Best/Gheciu 2014: 33), or domestic with 
international (Bogdandy et al. 2017: 134). Rather, authority establishes a link between 
these spheres. Therefore, this article denotes the public-private constellation as the 
fourth component in which authority is embedded. 
In Westphalian concepts of public authority, the two “significant elements are the 
public nature of authority and its identity as a social construction” (Cutler 1999: 62, 
also cf. Friedman 1990; Lincoln 1994). Cutler emphasizes that “the ‘publicness’ of au-
thority is constituted by a distinction between private and public activities” (Cutler 
1999: 63). This division is based on the notion of an apolitical private sphere, in which 
economic and market activities are conducted, and a public sphere in which legitimate 
state power is exercised (ibid.: 64).  
This dichotomy between public and private spheres is being challenged in the 
global governance literature:vi The strong interaction between public and private in 
global governance research appears in the shadow of hierarchy (Héritier 2002; Börzel 
2008; Graz/Nölke 2008a: 13), the participation of private actors are taking part in pub-
lic mechanisms, regulating themselves and others (Peters et al. 2009), the mutual in-
fluence between state and non-state actors (Wolf 2012: 197f.; Ruggie 2004), a public 
expression of the social relationship between the ruler and the ruled (Hall/Biersteker 
2002: 5), in deliberative procedures (Best/Gheciu 2014) or through commonly shared 
social norms (Hurd 1999). The “rise of private authority is not simply an external force 
that constraints the state. It is partly endogenous to the state” (Sassen 2006: 223, also 
Cutler et al. 1999: 16 ff.). Hence, the constitutive connection to the public sphere asso-
                                                   
vi To be sure, this model of a dichotomy between public and private has been criticized before, espe-
cially in feminist approaches to (international) political theory and international law. Cf. Okin 1991; 
Chinkin 1999; Pateman 1983, also Mill 2001. 
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ciates the authority of private actors (directly or indirectly) with formal or institu-
tional ties. 
[T]here are good reasons to doubt that rules established between private actors can live 
on their own, whether factually or normatively speaking. The claim for the desirability 
of a ‘public’ dimension expresses the awareness and conviction that social interactions 
are, and should be, regulated by rules that emerge from discourses about common in-
terests. (Bogdandy et al. 2017: 121)  
Similarly, the concept of private authority captures non-state actors’ ability to as-
sume regulatory functions in the public (Cutler et al. 1999a; Hall/Biersteker 2002; 
Hansen/Salskov-Iversen 2008). It combines two ostensibly contradictory dimensions 
by applying public authority to private actors – thereby revealing a genuine associa-
tion between the private and the public. Even approaches that reject the notion of pri-
vate authority acknowledge these elements: global governance contains private actors 
referring to public authority. The notion of global governance then “refers to public 
authority, independent of the question whether it is carried out by state or non-state 
actors. It involves an element of ‘publicness’” (Zürn 2018: 4).  
Against this background, this article argues that the public-private constellation 
in global governance does not simply lead to a blurring, fluidity or dissolution of the 
two, as it is sometimes suggested (Stewart 2018: 246; Ciepley 2013: 141; Solomon 
2010). Rather, the article suggests understanding the relationship between public and 
private as internally and externally mediated: each constitutes the other; each is 
shaped by the other; and neither would exist without the other. Public and private are 
externally mediated in that each sphere’s inclusion is the other sphere’s exclusion, 
and vice versa. They are internally mediated in the sense that each sphere 
(re)produces and (in)forms the scope, logics and content of the other sphere, by means 
of regulation, deregulation or non-intervention. Rather than considering one sphere 
as residual of the other (Biersteker/Hall 2002: 203), each sphere has specific functions 
for (and effects on) the other. The mutual constitution takes place in such a pervasive 
way that each builds a constitutive part of the other (cf. Figure 1). At the same time, 
the two remain distinct: they do not dissolve into each other, but retain their own 
logics, even though their (internal) content and (external) boundaries may change 
(Mende 2020). 
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     Figure 1: The public-private constellation 
Notions and definitions of what is considered public or private vary considerably. 
However, their mutually constitutive constellation remains. In the context of global 
governance (fueled by international law), state actors are seen as public actors, and 
non-state actors as private actors (Büthe/Mattli 2017; Schirm 2004; Peters et al. 2009). 
2.5 Interim conclusion: Authority in global governance 
In sum, the triad between power, legitimacy and the reference to public interests and 
their mutual influence and interdependence, embedded within the public-private con-
stellation, constitutes authority in global governance (cf. Table 1).  
While an actor holding institutionalized functions in global governance provides 
the most visible case for its authority, this paper does not confine authority to institu-
tionalization. Rather, it includes both soft and hard forms of authority in global gov-
ernance, varying with the degree of institutionalization and the scope of competences.  
 
Authority 
Power 
1) Instrumental power 
2) Agenda-setting power 
3) Discursive power 
Legitimacy 
Recognition 
Relational 
Based on perception 
Shared beliefs, norms, justifications 
Reference to public interests 
Points of reference: 
a) Public goods 
b) International peace and security 
c) Human rights 
Not fulfillment or recognition of ful-
fillment, but claim by authority 
Public-private constellation  
External mediation (one’s inclusion = 
the other’s exclusion) 
Internal mediation (mutual constitu-
tion, each inherent in the other) In-
dependent from the other, not 
blurred 
Table 1: The four components of authority in global governance 
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Since the three components shape each other causally, changes in one can explain 
changes in the other. At the same time, each component may entail dimensions and 
effects that go beyond the triad of authority (e.g., illegitimate power). Other than in 
the mutually constitutive mediation between public and private, the components in 
the triad do not cease to exist without the others. They may spring from other causal 
mechanisms, and yield other external effects.  
While the four components do not address all possible definitions and controver-
sies associated with the notion of authority in global governance, they provide a 
common framework of analysis that can help accentuate different approaches to au-
thority, which place different degrees of emphasis on each component. This frame-
work thus aims to provide a common basis for further research and debate.  
3.  Business Companies as Global Governance Actors 
The remainder of this article applies the triadic framework of authority in global gov-
ernance and its embedding in the public-private constellation to the empirical case of 
business enterprises, which are one of the most important actors in global governance 
(Börzel/Deitelhoff 2018; Büthe/Mattli 2017; Mikler 2013; Backer 2011; Avant et al. 
2010; Haufler 2001). The paper addresses all business enterprises without equating 
them. It thus follows international documents such as the UNGPs and the OECD Guide-
lines, given the complexity of transnational companies, and the relevance of small and 
medium-sized companies. In a first step, this section addresses the power, legitimacy 
and reference to public interests of companies in global governance. The subsequent 
sections scrutinize the components’ triadic relationships, studying the case of busi-
ness and human rights, and how they are embedded within the public-private constel-
lation. 
Business power in global governance appears with all three faces of power. A 
company’s instrumental power is closely tied to its size, resources, networks and 
wealth (Fuchs 2013: 82ff., also Epstein 1973, 1974; Bennie et al. 2016). It manifests in 
the ability to directly influence others’ behavior and the output side of politics, most 
prominently via lobbying.  
The second face, companies’ agenda-setting power to influence policy input, and 
to set and interpret norms and rules, is particularly connected to global governance. It 
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comes into play in companies’ participation in international organizations, public-
private partnerships, multi-stakeholder initiatives and roundtables, and in the devel-
opment of norms and codes of conduct with which companies can regulate their own 
and other companies’ behavior (Peters et al. 2009).  
Third, companies exercise discursive power. They influence ideas, norms and 
identities via their products, their advertisement, and the ways they engage in society, 
such as in education and social institutions (Fuchs 2004: 138ff.). Even before the rise of 
global governance, economist Bowen, the “Father of Corporate Social Responsibility” 
(Carroll 1999: 270), describes the extent to which business activities shape lives and 
society (Bowen 2013 [1953]: 8ff.). He argues that companies’ behavior contributes to 
the individual standard of living, economic stability and economic progress, but also 
to societal order, national security, justice and freedom: “it comprises so large an ele-
ment of human time, of human interrelationship, and of personality expression. It is 
not only a means to human life and human ends but a large part of human life, and an 
end in itself” (ibid.: 11). This extensive corporate influence can take several forms, and 
can either strengthen or inhibitvii social and public issues. Companies’ discursive 
power is mirrored, for example, in the paradigm of nudging – the assumption that 
companies should use their ability to shape behavior to do ‘good’ (Thaler/Sunstein 
2008; Mende 2016). Campaigns such as the United Nations Global Compact or the Un-
stereotype Alliance demonstrate a high awareness of such power. The latter platform, 
launched in 2018 by transnational companies and convened by UN Women, “seeks to 
eradicate harmful gender-based stereotypes” in advertisement.viii Ultimately, while 
companies may strive for discursive power on top of their usual activities (e.g. by ad-
vertising positions in public debate, Fuchs 2013: 85), it is also deeply integrated into 
their core business activities. 
Discursive and agenda-setting powers depend heavily on immaterial factors and a 
company’s reputation, such as its moral standing or the quality of its expertise. They 
are thus most closely connected to a company’s legitimacy. Nevertheless, they are also 
related to instrumental power, which for some companies, especially transnational 
                                                   
vii Just cf. Adam Smith’s famous notion of a “conspiracy against the public”, when “people of the 
same trade” assemble (Smith 2007 [1776]: 105). 
 
16 
 
enterprises, surpasses that of (certain) states (Mikler 2013: 4). While size and resources 
may not directly translate into power (Fuchs 2013: 87), “a firm’s ability to become po-
litically active […] also increases with its size” (Bernhagen/Mitchell 2010: 1177). Public 
visibility of a company’s material power goes hand in hand with demands to legiti-
mize that power by contributing to public interests, which serves as the basis of the 
long tradition of corporate philanthropy.  
Hence, all three faces of business power take effect in global governance. This is 
due to the extent of corporate power, and to the realm in which this power is exer-
cised. All three faces of power are increasingly exercised in the realm of politics: Com-
panies take on political activities and perform political power (Fuchs 2013: 87; Bern-
hagen/Mitchell 2010: 1177; Voss 2013: 29; Wettstein 2009; Pies 2011; Scherer/Palazzo 
2007; Kolleck 2013). This includes companies’ abilities to regulate others and them-
selves (Crane et al. 2008; Peters et al. 2009; Cutler 2018; Green 2014). Some elements 
of these powers result from states’ delegation or deregulation mechanisms, while oth-
ers develop in governance gaps. Both are based on some kind of legitimacy.  
According to Bowen, long before the establishment of the neoliberal paradigm, 
“business, like government, is basically ‘of the people, by the people, and for the peo-
ple.’ Such power […] is given because the ‘people’ believe this decentralization to be 
desirable” (Bowen 2013 [1953]: 5f.). This (admittedly very far-reaching) legitimacy is 
mirrored in less far-reaching but similar mechanisms in global governance. Here, 
companies’ legitimacy is based on the belief in their expertise (Cutler et al. 1999), the 
quality and output of their products or services (Brühl/Rittberger 2001), or their social 
behavior such as with codes of conduct, social engagement, and dialogue with social 
and political partners (Voss 2013: 30). Furthermore, their governance legitimacy does 
not necessarily involve a direct relation with the thereby affected. It may also rest 
upon their recognition of other global governance actors, demonstrated, e.g., in fora of 
cooperation and public-private partnerships. Additionally, apathy (Hall/Biersteker 
2002: 5), silent approval (Wettstein 2009: 210), and the absence of contestation may 
contribute to companies’ de facto legitimacy. 
                                                                                                                                                     
viii http://www.unstereotypealliance.org. Last access: April 2020. 
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These mechanisms of legitimacy are closely tied to the third component of au-
thority: the reference to public interests.  
How is that possible? Why do we allow actors with such predominance […] in the sup-
posedly democratic political game? The answer to this question points to the normative 
embedding of the depicted developments in power. The dominance of neoliberal norms 
in the past decades, with the associated focus on growth and efficiency, has meant that 
business has come to be seen as the primary expert, able to deliver in the “public in-
terest.” (Fuchs 2013: 87) 
Business activities coincide with the three points of reference for public interests dis-
cussed above. First, companies provide or are deeply involved in the provision of pub-
lic goods such as water, electricity, infrastructure, health, education or housing, or the 
funding of research at public universities (Best/Gheciu 2014: 18f.; Bernhagen/Mitchell 
2010; Graz/Nölke 2008b; Moon/Knudsen 2018). This involvement has risen tremen-
dously in recent decades with the political course of privatization. At the same time, 
privatization does not simply detach these issue areas from the realm of public inter-
ests. 
Second, companies are involved in matters of conflict, peace and security, which 
were seen to be the prerogative of states in the Westphalian world order. Companies 
are engaged in these matters through the privatization of security and armies (Gal-Or 
2014; Deitelhoff/Wolf 2010). This involvement has a long history, for example with the 
“diversion of productive resources from civilian to military purposes” (Bowen 2013 
[1953]: 11), medieval merchant associations (Cutler 2003), and the rights of colonial 
companies such as the British East India Company to conduct war and make peace in 
India (Avant/Haufler 2014).  
Third, human rights have become a major subject of business activities, and of so-
cietal expectations towards companies. Since the 1990s, when civil society organiza-
tions drew considerable attention to companies’ involvement or complicity in human 
rights violations, the human rights regime has begun to take business actors into ac-
count (Cragg 2012; Deva/Bilchitz 2013; Addo 1999). Pivotal instruments such as the UN 
Global Compact, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) address businesses’ responsibility to 
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respect human rights on the global level.ix While discussions of business and human 
rights are marked by fierce debate,x they unanimously contribute to an extension of 
business responsibilities with regard to human rights as a part of public interests, on 
the one hand, and to societal expectations towards companies to assume such respon-
sibilities, on the other.  
4.  Business Authority and Human Rights 
How, then, do businesses’ power, legitimacy and reference to public interests contrib-
ute to and explain their authority in global governance? Analyzing the relationship 
between the three components helps answer this question. This section focuses on 
business responsibilities for human rights as an example of the reference to public 
interests, because the issue area of business and human rights is an illustrative case 
for business authority in global governance: “human rights apply wherever govern-
ance occurs” (Goodhart 2006: 37). The triadic relationship between power, legitimacy 
and reference to human rights in business authority is double-edged: each component 
rebounds on the other.  
First, power and human rights influence each other. The absence of states that are 
able (or willing) to act, and the existence of companies with a greater capacity to act 
than states, has created expectations for firms to become responsible actors for hu-
man rights. This transcends the classic state-centered human rights regime (Andreo-
poulos et al. 2006; Clapham 2006). It is mirrored in the discussion, whether a compa-
ny’s power might provide one criterion for a leverage-based human rights responsi-
bility (Wood 2012), or whether this inappropriately assumes that ‘can implies ought’ 
(HRC 2008: 19f.), as Ruggie, author of the UNGPs, notes. The UNPGs do address at least a 
soft form of leverage-based responsibility (Wood 2012), requiring companies to “pre-
vent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their opera-
                                                   
ix They are accompanied by non-binding (and a few binding) national mechanisms, such as National 
Action Plans or the French Corporate Duty of Vigilance Law. 
x Major disagreements relate to how companies can be addressed in international law, whether 
regulation of companies should be binding or non-binding, direct or indirect, and how to navigate 
business responsibilities between the private responsibility to respect human rights, on the one 
hand, and public state duties to protect and fulfill human rights, on the other (Kamminga/Zia-Zarifi 
2000; Schutter 2006; Noortmann et al. 2015; Kobrin 2009). 
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tions, products or services by their business relationships, even if they have not con-
tributed to those impacts” (UN 2011: §13). 
In any case, the adoption of human rights responsibilities increases companies’ 
agenda-setting and discursive powers, because they can get involved in the develop-
ment, interpretation and implementation of human rights (norms). This assessment 
does not even have to engage with the controversial juridical question of whether 
companies should become legal subjects of international law (cf. Nowak/Januszewski 
2015: 118f.). The mutually reinforcing relationship between power and human rights 
also transcends the controversy between soft law and hard law, i.e., companies’ bind-
ing and non-binding responsibilities. It applies to both. At the same time, power and 
the reference to human rights can limit each other. The prosecution and sanctioning 
of human rights violations and related behavior of enterprises (or the threat thereof) 
can inhibit their power. Vice versa, a limited power of companies can restrain their 
abilities to contribute to human rights. 
Second, the relationship between human rights and legitimacy demonstrates that 
business legitimacy in global governance is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, 
referring to human rights helps companies legitimize their (other) activities, which 
motivates them to develop codes of conduct, self-commitments, roundtables, philan-
thropic engagement and corporate social responsibility (CSR) measures. They provide 
companies with a “social license to operate” (Ruggie/Sherman 2017: 294). On the other 
hand, increasing civil society attention to business conduct with regard to human 
rights compels companies to legitimize their activities. Brand-sensitive or otherwise 
publicly visible companies can no longer ignore or remain silent about proximate 
human rights violations. They have to take action to avoid damaging their reputation 
and legitimacy, and in turn their authority. The relationship between human rights 
and legitimacy thus represents both an opportunity and pressure with regard to com-
panies’ authority in global governance; it provides both access and restriction.  
Third, the relationship between power and legitimacy applies to companies as ac-
tors in global governance more generally. The power of companies endows them with 
the ability to gain (and also explains their) access to legitimacy, especially via partici-
pation in global governance fora. Vice versa, if a company manages to strengthen its 
legitimacy, for instance by providing expertise or by plausibly referring to human 
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rights, it consolidates its position of power in global governance, and thus its authori-
ty. This point also demonstrates that the triad does not only consist of the two-pole 
relations between its components. Rather, the triadic components of authority are 
very closely related. If a company is compelled to legitimize its activities by commit-
ting to human rights, this gives other actors an instrument to challenge the compa-
ny’s power. As an activist from the International Labor Rights Fund’s campaign against 
Nike explains: “hypocrites are far more interesting than mere wrongdoers, and it’s 
been much easier to sensitize press and public to Nike’s failure to implement its own 
code of conduct than to its failure to comply with Indonesian labor laws” (Bama 
Athreya cited in Rowe 2005: 123f., also cf. Risse et al. 2013, 1999).  
In sum, the relationship between power, legitimacy and the reference to public 
interests constitutes business authority in global governance. However, the compo-
nents do not rely exclusively on their interaction, but entail dimensions and effects 
that go beyond the triad, or even counter mechanisms (cf. Figure 2). Other mecha-
nisms also enable and restrict companies’ power, such as competition and economic 
pressure, political and legal restrictions, protectionism, the extent and complexity of 
global markets and global supply and value chains (cf. Crane et al. 2008: 46). Social 
businesses provide another example. Their orientation towards the common good does 
not endow them with more power than purely profit-oriented multinational enter-
prises. Furthermore, some companies are capable of pursuing their activities and 
powers without legitimacy – especially those companies that are less visible to the 
public, or those activities that take place in the folds and gaps of global governance 
and in the lowest tiers of supply chains. In contrast, the more a company acts as an 
authority in global governance, the greater its need of legitimacy, and hence its refer-
ence to public interests. The triad thus allows analyzing the gaps and challenges that 
business authority may pose in – and through – global governance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 
 
Figure 2: The triad of business authority 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.  Business Authority between and beyond Public and Private 
There is a widespread criticism in global governance research (and in human rights 
activism) that companies’ authority is not adequately captured in legal, political or 
conceptual terms. “While thus provided with a form of political authority and legiti-
macy as a political actor in the wider sense, the neoliberal frame has also meant that 
global companies have not come to be seen as political actors in the narrow sense” 
(Fuchs 2013: 87, also Cutler 2018: 62; Wettstein 2009). This article argues that one of 
the reasons for this blank space lies in the way that business authority escapes the 
two-pole constellation between public and private that is pervasive in both the inter-
national human rights regime and global governance. The blank space even applies to 
the model of mutual constitution between public and private as introduced above. 
Nevertheless, this model still plays an important role in understanding the peculiar 
position of companies. This article argues that business enterprises as global govern-
ance actors transcend the classification of public and private roles. They extend the 
two-pole constellation with a third pole, which has a mutually constitutive relation-
ship with the other poles as well. Business authority, then, differs from public as well 
as from private authority. It is a peculiar third type.  
This hybrid character of company roles that escapes both public and private des-
ignations is evident in all three components of authority. With regard to power, com-
panies’ activities and agency, the extent and the effects of their powers transcend 
their own realm to such an extent that they outgrow the role of mere private actors. 
 
22 
 
The power to regulate themselves and others, and to develop and interpret norms and 
rules (i.e. their agenda-setting and discursive powers) transcends any definition of the 
private. However, companies are not officially entitled to govern others. In this regard, 
they are not public actors. Then again, de jure, every company (or their legal repre-
sentatives) is subject to a state’s jurisdiction and to civil law, just as any private actor. 
De facto, however, companies largely yield their powers on a global level, which is 
much more difficult to regulate than national jurisdictions. It requires international 
law and global forms of cooperation and governance. What is more, while internation-
al law does not perceive companies as subjects of international law, it acknowledges 
them as actors in international law (Wouters/Chané 2015). Multilateral agreements 
and arbitration mechanisms already treat companies as (global) subjects, thereby con-
tributing to their power (Steininger 2018) and dragging them out of the private 
sphere. 
The power of companies is one of the main motivations to demand their legitima-
cy. Purely private actors do not have to legitimize their private activities in the public; 
companies do. At the same time, the demand for legitimacy also provides them with 
access to public legitimacy, thereby further dragging them out of the private realm. 
Yet, neither empirical developments nor normative demands tend to equate compa-
nies’ legitimacy with that of states. Hence, the double-edged legitimacy situates com-
panies beyond both the public and private. 
The third component of business authority, the reference to public interests, fur-
ther differentiates companies from both public and private authority. For states and 
international organizations, the reference to public interests (even if it is disputed or 
underdeveloped) builds the very foundation of their authority. Business actors, by 
contrast, are perceived to legitimately follow their private interests – just as any oth-
er private actor. However, their contribution to public interests is perceived as some-
thing that can or should be reconciled (or even equated) with their private interests 
(cf. Kurucz et al. 2008; Clarke 2017). In all of these perspectives (if they do not chal-
lenge the capitalistic order as a whole), private business interests remain valid, but 
the search for ways to reconcile them with public interests transcends the private. 
At this point, it could be argued that the mixture of private and public interests 
still qualifies business authority as private, since the concept of private authority in 
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global governance already captures both public and private dimensions, as shown 
above. However, companies also have roles that cannot be defined as either public or 
private in the first place. These hybrid elements include the extent and quality of 
business power, their double-edged legitimacy, and their involvement in public inter-
ests.  
The fact that what appear to be private actors (NGOs, civil society, firms) are increas-
ingly engaged in public practices (such as processes of public deliberation and the pur-
suit of public purposes) is too easily viewed as simply another example of the rise of 
private authority – missing the crucial ways in which these practices are redefining 
those actors as public because of what they do, not where they are situated. 
(Best/Gheciu 2014: 17)  
At the same time, this article argues, it is pivotal to differentiate between business 
authority and public authority. States, as public actors, are legal subjects of interna-
tional law, which are capable of making and implementing law, restricting liberty and 
executing force. They are public actors because they are endowed with judicative, leg-
islative and executive powers in order to safeguard public interests. “We define as 
public those goods, actors, or processes that are recognized by the community in 
which they are carried out as being of common concern” (ibid.: 32, also Abraham-
sen/Williams 2014; Reus-Smit 2001). For this reason, states are (or should be) demo-
cratically legitimized.xi Companies are not public actors according to this definition. 
Yet, they are so deeply involved in public affairs and public interests that they are not 
fully private actors either.  
To summarize, enterprises have both private roles (their self-interest, their as-
signment to a state’s jurisdiction and to civil law) and public roles (their participation 
in global governance, in (self-) regulation and in the provision of public goods). They 
also have hybrid roles that cannot be described as public or private in the first place 
(the extensive effects of their actions on others, the access to and the demand for pub-
lic legitimacy). 
Therefore, this article argues, business authority creates a peculiar third between 
and beyond the public and the private.xii It is entangled with both (between), but also 
                                                   
xi Even though not all states accomplish that ideal, it creates a major normative yardstick for states, 
in contrast to dictatorships and totalitarianism. 
xii For discussions that address the hybrid roles of companies, cf. the concepts of political corporate 
social responsibility (Scherer et al. 2016; Scherer/Palazzo 2007), global corporate social responsibil-
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escapes them in important regards (beyond). Business authority clearly differs from 
public authority. Compared to the concept of private authority in global governance, 
the notion of business authority as a peculiar third provides a more nuanced way to 
deal with the (limits of) the public-private constellation (cf. Table 2). 
 
 Power Legitimacy Reference to public 
interests 
Public authority Public  
 
Public 
 
Public 
 
Private authority Private 
Public  
Private 
Public 
 
Private 
Public 
 
Business authority Private 
Public  
Hybrid  
Private 
Public 
Hybrid  
Private 
Public 
Hybrid  
Table 2: Business authority as a peculiar third 
The concept of business authority as a peculiar third is based on perceiving companies 
as a third type of actor, a third pole in the constellation of public and private. This ar-
gument extends the two-pole medation between public and private into a relationship 
between three intermediated poles that mutually constitute each other. The private 
(e.g. the family, gender identities) is shaped and formed by both the public (e.g. state 
regulation of marriage and child care) and the business pole (e.g. wage politics, adver-
tisement, gender-aware recruitment strategies), and vice versa.xiii At the same time, 
the poles do not dissolve or blur into each other (Figure 3). Rather, they remain dis-
tinct, with distinct features, roles, and contributions to authority in global govern-
ance. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
ity (Stohl et al. 2007), democratic corporate social responsibility (Levy/Kaplan 2008: 439ff.), extended 
corporate citizenship (Crane et al. 2008), corporations as next to governments (Wettstein 2009; 
Ciepley 2013), private government (Anderson 2017), companies as social actors (Brühl/Hofferberth 
2013) and the political power and authority of companies (Fuchs 2013: 87; Atal 2019). 
xiii For a detailed delineation of an intermediated, mutually constitutive three-pole relationship 
between public, private and business, cf. Mende 2020. 
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6. Conceptual and Normative Conclusions 
This article analyzes authority in global governance by scrutinizing the triadic com-
ponents of power, legitimacy and reference to public interests, and how they are em-
bedded in the constellation between public and private. It develops a theoretical 
framework, which it then applies to companies as major actors in global governance, 
focusing on the case of business and human rights. Finally, it suggests perceiving 
business authority as a peculiar third between and beyond the public and private.  
The triadic concept of business authority is both conceptually and normatively 
relevant. Conceptually, it reveals the interconnections of power with legitimacy and 
the reference to public interests that establish business authority in global govern-
ance, and it captures the empirical powers of companies that partly transcend national 
and intergovernmental legislation.xiv It thus provides a basis to investigate the ques-
tions that arise from such authority.  
Developing business authority as a peculiar third also allows to go one step fur-
ther and scrutinize the authority of other non-state actors in global governance in 
order to analyze how they transcend the public-private constellation (such as non-
governmental organizations and civil society associations).xv 
                                                   
xiv This point cannot be overstated: The paper does not normatively demand the peculiar form of 
business authority; rather, it conceptualizes its empirical existence. 
xv Cf. for example research on global civil society Brysk 2005; Ruggie 2004; Steffek et al. 2008. 
Figure 3: Three-pole mediation between business, 
public and private 
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Furthermore, the triadic concept demonstrates the ambivalence of business re-
sponsibilities for human rights (or other public interests). On the one hand, given the 
extent of business power, such responsibilities seem to be uncircumventable. On the 
other hand, they affect companies’ power and legitimacy, including in disputable 
ways. More concretely, the triad facilitates discussion of the dangers (1) that business 
responsibilities will undermine states’ responsibilities for human rights (Wettstein 
2009: 243; Rosemann 2005, but see Nowak/Januszewski 2015), (2) of institutionalizing 
too much trust in companies to contribute to public interests whilst pursuing their 
own (Stewart 2018), and (3) of endowing companies with too much power (Bishop 
2012). The triad also allows to take into account how companies strengthen their 
agency and power by acting as subjects of human rights: “international law has fur-
ther cemented economic structures by lending the authority of the human rights dis-
course to the rather mundane goal of maximizing corporate profits” (Steining-
er/Bernstorff 2018: 14).  
Normatively, the triad can help balance the three components of business authori-
ty. A company’s power can provide a viable yardstick when deciding how to develop 
business responsibilities for human rights. The scope, form and extent of business 
responsibilities could be closely related to their power.xvi This yardstick could be fur-
ther differentiated with regard to the instrumental, agenda-setting and discursive 
aspects of business power, and how each is connected to legitimating mechanisms. 
Vice versa, the regulation of business power, e.g., granting them access to global gov-
ernance fora, could be tied much more closely to a company’s human rights perfor-
mance. This yardstick could also be used to regulate business power in other areas.  
Ultimately, the peculiar role of business authority between and beyond public and 
private can provide new mechanisms of global governance that are not restricted by 
the dichotomous choice to perceive companies as either public or private. Companies 
are both, and they are neither. Accordingly, this suggests a way around the notorious 
discussion in the issue area of business and human rights of whether to endow enter-
prises only with private responsibilities or to burden them with state duties. Rather, 
treating enterprises as a peculiar third pole allows to develop appropriate forms of 
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business responsibilities for human rights, which will require extending the public-
private distinction in human rights law. Ultimately, approaches that take companies’ 
empirically peculiar authority into account can build a conceptual basis for norma-
tively delineating their roles, rights and duties in global governance. 
                                                                                                                                                     
xvi Similarly, the question of states’ extraterritorial human rights obligations is tied to “the state’s 
exercise of power and control, whether directly or indirectly” (Augenstein 2016: 686). 
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